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Introduction
Research on firms' investment spending suggests that there exists a gap between the costs of external and internal financing and thus, the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller 1958) does not hold. 1 Cross-country studies clearly point out that German or Japanese firms show lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than AngloSaxon firms (Harhoff 1998; Bond et al. 1999 Bond et al. , 2003 Hall et al. 1999) . Thereby it appears that intermediated financial systems, characterized by the prominence of relationship lending, are more able to channel financial resources to firms than the AngloSaxon market-based system at arm's length. 2 Studies about the competition in Germany's banking sector (Audretsch and Elston 1997; Deeg 1998; Vitols 1998; Audretsch and Elston 2002) shed light on the question whether the dominance of public sector banks (savings banks, state banks) and cooperative banks may be an additional factor explaining cross-country differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities. Both pillars have an explicit mandate to promote small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Furthermore, due to the higher degree of local embedding there may exist an informational advantage compared to commercial banks.
One may expect that firms with relationship banking to savings banks and cooperative banks show significant lower financing constraints. Related to this issue, there is an extensive debate at the European Commission and German authorities about the liberalization of savings banks and its impact on SMEs' finance. 3 Empirical evidence, how-5 ever, is rather scarce (see Caletti et al. 2005: 48) , but is a prerequisite for structural changes of the banking system (Sachverständigenrat 2004 ).
This study explicitly addresses the differences in the dependence of firms on internal funds with respect to the type of house bank of a firm using accounting data from 1,451
German firms. The data is provided by Creditreform and Bureau van Dijk through the Dafne database and covers the period from 1998 to 2004. The contribution of the paper is threefold: We test the hypothesis that public sector banks and cooperative banks are more likely to reduce the funding gap of SMEs than commercial banks. Based on this finding, we evaluate the role of the public sector banks pillar to explain cross-country differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities. Finally, we highlight the differences between firms attached to public sector banks compared to those attached to cooperative banks in order to ask for the needs and alternatives of public ownership of banks.
Following Bond et. al (2003) , we subsequently estimate an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ADL) via Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) to test for differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities regarding the type of bank attachment. Whereas the model allows a flexible specification of short-run investment dynamics, the GMM method controls for unobserved firm-specific effects and allows for endogenous explanatory variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of Germany's financial system. We explicate the empirical approach as well as the database in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
An overview of Germany's credit institutions
German business finance is characterized by a comparatively high degree of debt finance. Audretsch and Elston (1997: 102) report a debt-to-equity ratio of 4 in Germany compared to a ratio of 1.3 in the U.S. Especially small-and medium-sized firms draw 6 Dirk Engel und Torge Middendorf heavily upon debt finance with an equity-to-total assets ratio of 7.5 % in 2003 and 10 % in 2004 (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 2006a . The supply of funds is covered by three main groups of financial intermediaries: (i) commercial banks like Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, Hypo-Vereinsbank and smaller private sector banks, (ii) public sector banks, namely savings banks (Sparkassen) and state banks (Landesbanken) owned by municipalities and the government of the federal states, respectively and (iii) cooperative banks (Genossenschaftsbanken).
As reported by the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (2006b: 25) , three fourth of the German Mittelstand are financed by savings banks. Aggregate data of the Deutsche Bundesbank shows that around 61 % of the stock of long-term loans to firms was provided by public sector banks in 2005, whereas 27.4 % stemmed from commercial banks and 11.6 % from cooperative banks. In 1990, the share of long-term loans provided by the public sector banks marked at 42 % and thus, was remarkably lower than in 2005. The increasing dominance of public sector banks is also evident concerning the transfer of publicly assisted loans: In 2002, public sector banks transferred about 52 % of publicly assisted loan volume in Federal SME programmes; commercial banks had a market share of around 12 % (see Prantl et al. 2006) . 4 Twelve years before, commercial banks transferred 25 % percent of publicly assisted loan volume.
The strategic withdrawal of commercial banks from credit business seems to be mostly driven by the worsening of financial results. The interest rate spread (= interest earnings minus interest paid related to total assets) in credit business declined from 2.3 % to 1.0 % for commercial banks between 1994 and 2000. The reduction about 58 % is remarkably higher compared with those of savings banks (26 %) and cooperative banks 7 (22 %), respectively (Deutsche Bundesbank 2001: 37) . Furthermore, the return on equity is lower in Germany than in other European countries (Brunner et al. 2004 ). Commercial banks are confronted with the consequences of the liberalization of financial markets in the 1990s to a higher extent than public sector banks or cooperative banks.
As one consequence, commercial banks shift to investment banking and asset management in order to increase the overall profit margin and thus, to fulfill the expectations of investors at stock markets. For example, Deutsche Banks have remarkably increased its return on equity since 2002. German firms in general and SMEs in particular may suffer negatively from the stronger profit orientation of commercial banks.
In contrast, public sector banks pursue a so-called "regional principle": They are owned by the local or federal government and their activities are limited to the local area of its owner. Savings banks are owned by one or more municipalities and operate in the field of responsibility of the local government. In contrast, state banks can operate across the entire country and are mostly engaged in international business. Sparkassen laws of Federal States explicitly define a mandate to supply loans for SMEs and individuals as well as to promote the surrounding area of the savings bank as a whole. Based on this mandate, public sector banks need not to maximize their profit although a certain amount of profits is important. The Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe, the head of the savings banks, aims at a return on equity of 15 % (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe 2006b: 39). The mandate to promote SMEs and informational advantages as well as advantages to establish long-term relationships favor both savings banks and cooperative banks to supply adequate conditions to SMEs (see Cole et al. 2004 , Berger et al. 2005 . Hence, we expect that firms attached to one of these two pillars are confronted with lower financing constraints than firms attached to commercial banks. The departure of commercial banks from SME finance may strengthen the hypothesis additionally.
Yet, savings banks and cooperative banks differ in the business objectives of the bank.
Public ownership of the former speaks in favor of a special interest of municipalities to promote the regional economy. Owners of savings banks are likely to demonstrate the successful promotion of the regional economy to increase the probability of re-election (Eisinger 1993 , La Porta et al. 2002 . Therefore, in some cases, distressed borrowers are likely to receive credits again and politicians thus hope to secure jobs within the region. Public sector banks play an important role for SME finance and thus, the intended liberalization of the German banking system could affect the supply of loans to SMEs substantially. Based on the foregone reasoning, there are arguments that the public ownership of savings banks implies a lower dependence on internal funds of firms attached to savings banks compared to firms attached to cooperative banks.
Recent empirical evidence by Nehls and Schmidt (2004) and Prantl et al. (2006) contributes to these presumptions. The latter observed that young firms attached to savings banks or cooperative banks exhibit a higher probability to get access to loans of the federal government. While these loans are cheaper, firms are more likely to reduce their funding gap. Nehls and Schmidt (2004) point out that there have been some signs of a credit crunch in Germany in 2002. Applying a disequilibrium-model, they show that a shortening of loans by commercial banks is mostly responsible for their results (Nehls and Schmidt 2004) . This speaks in favor of a higher dependence on internal funds of firms with a commercial house bank.
Empirical approach

Empirical Investment Equation
We start with a rather parsimonious error-correction model (see Bond et al. 2003 ) in which investment is dependent on production and the user cost of capital (see Jorgensen 1963), whose variation can presumably be approximated by firm-and time-fixed effects. As the time dimension in our panel is short, the influence of initial conditions on subsequent investment behavior needs to be taken into account. Moreover, in the case of adjustment costs, the desired capital stock only reacts sluggishly and gives rise to shortterm dynamics:
In this ADL (2,2) model k it denotes the log of the desired capital stock of firm i in period t, y it the log of output of firm i in period t, D i the firm-fixed effects, Z t time-fixed effects and İ it an error term. Under the assumption that there is a long-run unit elasticity of capital to output and those two series are cointegrated, which is tested in our empirical analysis, the reparameterized ADL model can be extended by an error correction term. The coefficient on the term ) ( Test supported this procedure. However, because each Dafne update provides only information about the current bank relationship, we use historical annual data for the relationship banking from the ZEWFirm Panel, which is also based on Creditreform data.
Data description
The accounting data was initially checked for logical errors, missing data, and outliers (see Appendix A for details). We consider all firms with unconsolidated accounts, an annual turnover of 100,000 Euro and more and with a main activity in the private sector (the agricultural sector, utility companies, banks, insurance and other financial companies are excluded). The observation period is limited to the years 1998 to 2004 as data on the firms' bank relationships is only available for these years.
The identification of primary relationship banking is difficult for companies with multiple relations to banks of different pillars. Therefore only firms with bank relationships to one or multiple savings banks, one or more multiple cooperative banks or one or more private banks have been included in the sample. Despite this restriction, we still detect a significant number of firms attached to one of the three banking groups only.
Firms attached to cooperative banks only form the smallest group with 201 observations, followed by firms attached to savings banks, and those attached to commercial banks (see Table 1 ).
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Because of the requirement for lagged values and instruments, at least three observations for each firm have to be available. As a consequence, the sample is remarkably reduced and consists of 1,455 firms. The total number of observations in the GMM first difference estimations is 2,234 (Table 1) . Comparing the means of the variables to those of the variables used in Bond et al. (2003: 158) it becomes apparent that the investment ratio as well as the cash flow ratio are noticeably larger in our sample. Firms attached to savings banks show the lowest cash flow although it does not differ significantly from the mean of the other firms.
Total sales (y it , in thousand Euro), the age of the firm (age it , in years) and the probability of default (PD it , in %) inform about some major characteristics of the sample. The PD measure has been received via online-access of Moody's KMV (see Falkenstein et al. 2000) . The mean value lies something below the average probability of default of 1. 
Empirical results and discussion
Estimations results
We start with an analysis of the time series properties of our variables. This is done first of all, to check if our capital and sales series are cointegrated so that our ADL model can be extended to an error correction model. Secondly, we have to examine whether the use of lagged levels as instruments in our dynamic panel estimator causes a large finite-sample bias (Blundell and Bond 1998) . Therefore, at first we applied a panel unit root test to the log capital and log real sales series. Maddala and Wu (1999) propose a
Fisher test which combines individual Phillips-Peron (PP) and Augmented Dicky Fuller tests, respectively. They show that it has a greater power than the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel data unit root test 8 , at least in samples with a large time dimension. Yet both tests reject the null of a unit root at the 1%-significance level for both series. 9 Accordingly, we confine ourselves to estimating the rather parsimonious ADL model.
For the remaining variables of our model, the investment rate, the sales growth, the creditworthiness and the cash flow rate, we estimated AR(1) models by OLS, Difference-GMM and the fixed-effects estimator, respectively (see Table B .1 in Appendix B).
The series do not exhibit any strong persistence and the Difference-GMM estimate lies in between the OLS and fixed-effects estimates. The OLS estimates are biased upwards and the fixed-effects estimates are biased downwards. Thus, there seems to be no prob- 8 The Fisher test combines significance levels of the different tests rather than the test statistics as the IPS does. Both tests, however, do not rely on a common unit root process as for example the Levin-Lin test. 9 The tests were carried out including fixed effects with the maximum number of lags based on the Schwarz Information Criteria.
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lem of weak instruments and the use of lagged levels as instruments is sufficient to identify the parameters. Previous investment activity shows up significantly positive in all samples. As the coefficient is higher for large than for small firms this suggests a higher degree of inertia of business investment for the former group. The main variable of interest, the cash flow, is also significant and shows the expected sign. The contemporaneous impact of the cash flow on investment for large firms is close to estimates by Bond et al. (2003: 160) , who report a coefficient estimate of 0.180 for their sample of large German firms. Yet, the coefficient is smaller than the one estimated for small firms, which confirms previous findings that small firms are more financially constrained than large ones. This also becomes evident when looking at the probability of default: The median probability of default is 0.73 for large firms whereas it is 2.18 for small firms. In a further regression we find that firms with a higher probability of default (=more constrained firms) show higher investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with a lower probability of default (see Table B .2 in the Appendix B). These results are contrary to Cleary (1999) Table 2 .
Subsequently, we split the cash flow variable according to the firms' bank relationship.
We extend the investment equation with four interaction terms on the firms' cash flow 
Robustness of results
One may argue that firms' choice of bank attachment, however, may complicate the empirical test of our hypothesis. As firms might know about the role of savings banks and cooperative banks, more financially constrained firms might pre-select one of both.
In this case, bank attachment is not randomly distributed and depends on the observable and unobservable financial constraints of firms before they enter a firm-bankrelationship. We investigate this point in detail and compare estimates of OLS with estimates of Within-and GMM-models in Table B .3 in the Appendix B. Estimation results show that point estimates of the cash-flow coefficients for firms attached to savings-or cooperative banks are lower when applying the Within-or GMM-estimator.
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This is due to the fact that the latter two already control for time-invariant heterogeneity and thus for a huge part of a possible selection problem.
Finally, we test the robustness of our results. Restricting the sample to firms with at least four observations, the sample has been reduced to 1,252 observations, 100 of whom are affiliated with cooperative banks and 273 of whom are attached to savings banks. Again, the results provide no evidence that the type of bank relationship affects the dependence on internal funds. Furthermore we further restricted our sample to firms with relationship banking to only one bank instead of having one ore more business connections to banks of the same pillar. Yet, results were once again robust to this modification.
We also investigate indirectly whether duration of relationship biases our results. Berger and Udell (1995) report for the U.S. that interest rate on lines of credit decreases with the duration of the lending relationship. By contrast, Petersen and Rajan (1994) found a positive but insignificant effect on the price of loans based on the same data source. 13 Harhoff and Körting (1998) also did not find a direct impact on the interest rate for Germany, they show, however, that the probability of banks to demand collateral decreases with the duration of the lending relationship. Since we restrict our sample on ten year old SMEs, we try to reduce potential biases due to unobservable durations of the firmbank-relationship. In this unreported regression we do not detect any significant changes in the investment-cash flow sensitivities. 14 Recapitulating unobservable differences in the duration of the lending relationship seem not to imply differences in the investment-cash flow sensitivities of German firms shown in Table 3 .
13 Berger and Udell (1995) argue that the inclusion of transaction driven loans in the study of Petersen and Rajan (1994) primarily explains the different results. 14 Results of all mentioned robustness checks are available upon author's request.
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Discussion
Based on our empirical findings we conclude that the availability of internal funds seems not to be a more important factor for firms attached to commercial banks than for firms with relations to savings banks or cooperative banks. The historical mandate for promoting SMEs as well as the expected informational advantages of public sector banks and cooperative banks does not cause a lower dependence of their borrowers on internal funds.
In contrast to our study, Prantl et al. (2006) detect that the probability to receive a public assisted loan is sensitive to the firm's attachment to one of the three pillars of Germany's banking system. While Prantl et al. (2006) focused only on start-ups, we addressed the segment of small and medium sized enterprises as a whole. Information asymmetries may be very high for young firms in Prantl's study and thus, bank heterogeneity may matter to a higher extent. Restricting the sample to up to ten year old SMEs, our results do not change, however. On the one hand the generalization of our results for young firms may be hampered due to the small sample size and the expectation that young firms providing accounting data are a selective group of all young firms.
On the other hand, the interest rate of public assisted loan is expected to be marginal lower compared to the interest rate offered by the lender. Probably financing constraints are reduced to a minor extent due to the interest rate spread. Until now, an explicit test on the relationship between receiving a public assisted loan and the level of financing constraints is missing, however.
How can we explain that bank heterogeneity does not matter? In our point of view, rentseeking behavior may explain our findings. Degryse and Ongena (2005) found empirical support for spatial price discrimination. Lenders located close to their borrowers offer an interest rate to borrowers above the marginal cost of lending and thus, exploit Investment, Internal Funds and Public Banking in Germany 21 some rents. In our sample, the distance between firms and banks is lower for firms attached to savings banks or cooperative banks compared to firms attached to commercial banks. As savings banks and cooperative banks might as well make use of spatial price discrimination, this would imply a higher price on the loans as well as limited availability of loans. As consequence, spatial price discrimination may imply a higher dependence on internal funds.
Yet, credit cooperatives and savings banks seem to have a similar impact on the funding behavior of their borrowers. This result is in line with findings of Prantl et al. (2006) , who do not find any significant differences with respect to the probability to raise public assisted loans. Thus, the characteristic of public ownership and the explicit mandate to promote SMEs might not matter. Cooperative banks changed their on-site presence remarkably in the last ten years, however. At this stage, it is very difficult to evaluate how a specific change of the corporate form of savings banks may affect SMEs access to loans.
There are two main findings from our analysis: First, contrary to our expectations and the presumptions in the literature, the huge market share of public owned savings banks seems not to explain the overall low dependence of investments on internal funds in Germany. Second, public ownership seems not to imply lower financing constraints of German SMEs.
Conclusions
The paper addressed the question whether public banking, namely the large market share of savings banks and credit cooperatives in Germany, can explain the rather weak dependence of German firms on internal funds. Both bank groups have the mandate to promote the German Mittelstand, and are characterized by strong on-site presence, 22 Dirk Engel und Torge Middendorf which implies advantages to monitor the borrower. Thus, one could presume that firms attached to one of these two bank groups show a lower dependence of investment on internal funds than firms attached to commercial banks. Using accounting data on 1,455
German firms for the time period 1998-2004 and combining it with information on the firms' bank relationships we tested this hypothesis empirically. Following Bond et. al (1999) , we applied an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ADL) of firm investment.
For the whole sample of firms, the supply of internal funds has a positive impact on investment and this effect is similar in size compared to previous studies. Yet, estimation results reveal that there are no statistically significant differences in the dependence of investments on internal funds between firms attached to a commercial bank, firms attached to a cooperative bank, and those attached to a savings bank. Therefore, the prominence of public banking seems not to be responsible for the internationally low overall dependence of investments on internal funds in Germany. Furthermore, we do not detect any significant difference in the investment-cash flow sensitivity between firms attached to savings banks and those attached to cooperative banks. Concerning the currently ongoing debate about the privatization of savings banks, public ownership seems not to be essential for reducing financing constraints of German SMEs.
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Appendix A: Calculation of variables and definition of outliers
Tangible fixed assets (Ki,t) : land, property, plant and equipment deflated by the industrial sector price index of the gross capital stock Investments in tangible fixed assets (Ii,t) : first difference of tangible fixed assets plus deprecation on tangible fixed assets deflated by the industrial sector price index of investments in tangible fixed assets. As there is a high number of missing observations on the depreciation on fixed capital assets, we impute values for all observations. These are based on the following formula: depreciation on total assets multiplied with the ratio of tangible fixed capital assets to total assets. Table 2 . PD_Yellow: probability of default is between 1.0 and 2.6; PD_Red: probability of default is 2.6 or higher. 
